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Ridding PES Systems of the “Pay to Pollute”
Principle: PES Optimization Strategies
By Kelly Carlson

W

ith a stronger call to action on political and international relation fronts, the time to take meaningful
action and to implement any necessary reform pertaining to climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies
is now.1 In fact, upcoming annual climate change negotiations
led by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) make for the most sensible platform to reevaluate climate change proposals and contemplate areas needing reform.2
At the center of these climate change negotiations and
the UNFCCC work are country commitments.3 Country commitments are either hard or soft—meaning that they are either
hard number commitments to reduce pollutant emissions by a
certain amount or that they are commitments to implement various programs and strategies designed to reduce emissions in the
aggregate.4 Countries making hard commitments in furtherance
of the often cited two-degree goal are skeptical of those countries only willing to address climate change in the form of soft
commitment pledges.5 The skepticism might be warranted, especially for programs such as Payment for Environmental Services
(PES), which have a questionable impact on climate change
mitigation goals.6 PES as a mitigation scheme and its ability to
effectively address climate change as currently leveraged, is the
focus of this Article.
The traditional PES program operates as follows: a farmer or
landowner agrees to manage their land, either taking or abating
specific action, to provide an ecological service (e.g. biodiversity
conservation, carbon sequestration, or ecotourism promotion);
payments to the farmers and landowners operate as incentives,
making this system, in its traditional form, most similar to other
market-based strategies.7 Variations of this general scheme have
developed, especially to cover other natural resources in need of
conservation, namely watersheds.8 No matter the form a PES
program may take, one constant remains— all PES schemes
propagate the oft criticized “pay to pollute” concept.9 Countries
implementing PES and other “pay to pollute” projects in less
developed countries are negating emissions reductions realized
by the countries receiving the financial support because they
continue to pollute on their own home fronts, failing to create
any positive change in the aggregate.10
PES, having been implemented in various forms for decades,
has proven effective in certain ways: helping landowners realize
economic benefits in conserving the land rather than harvesting
it, stimulating local economies and effectively redistributing
wealth, and enabling the achievement of conservation goals, at
least locally.11 Despite these positives, current PES programs
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come up short on meeting true conservation goals devoid of
deceptive payor and service provider practices.12 Vast improvement is necessary if society and climate change negotiators
are to start viewing climate change strategies under a renewed
lens—one that scoffs at promoting the “pay to pollute” concept
in all its forms.
This Article argues that there are ways to achieve a more
pure PES scheme, accurately reflecting conservationist goals,
and devoid of the bad taste some of these soft commitment strategies leave in the mouths of fellow climate change negotiators.13
Five strategies for dissociating the “pay to pollute” concept currently intertwined with PES programs, and for realizing greater
conservation gains include:
1	
Decouple the payments from market value–This
objective aims to recover the PES goals of stewardship and accountability. Traditionally, payments for
environmental services, such as conservation of forest
hectares are determined by assessing the value of timber on the open marketplace.14 To posit that forests only
have inherent value as timber, a mere commodity is to
detract from the very reason PES was introduced as a
conservation method. Ideologically, true conservationism and pollution mitigation are in direct contention
with market and economic based incentives. Instead
of lost opportunity in the marketplace,15 conservation
payments should reflect the opportunity cost of keeping
the environment and ecological systems intact should
harvesting of the land’s resources occur. Though not
a currently contemplated payment scheme, it draws
parallels to restoration cost accounting conducted after
hazardous substance and oil spills in United States.16
2	Rid of the voluntary off-sets payment scheme–
Paying PES providers for the carbon offsets created
and for revenues generated from the sale of carbon
credits provides them with a renewed license to pollute
and negates any positive change realized from PES
programs.17 For example, the Australian Afforestation
Pty. Ltd. entails creating a timber plantation and carbon
sinks for carbon credits so that Toyota can turn around
and continue emitting carbon dioxide in its manufacturing process, operations, and the product it produces.18
3	Target developed countries - This objective refocuses
efforts away from traditional PES targets—undeveloped countries19 toward more sound prospects—developed countries with stronger socioeconomic posture.
23

These countries are better positioned to realize the
environmental benefits of PES, without giving way
to the volatility that PES projects might instigate.20
Developed countries are more likely to have reliable
governance structures and reporting mechanisms in
place to ensure the ancillary problems associated with
PES are kept at bay, including leakage, slippage, and
sham agreements.21 Developed countries are also more
likely to attribute greater value to conservation,22 rather
than placing products in the marketplace, so they will
not be tempted to engage in corruptive PES practices.
4	Target community property regimes–This objective contemplates that land held communally may be
more suitable for PES projects for a number of reasons. When land is held communally, there are more
accountable parties to the contract, more watchful
eyes, and are innately better designed for governance
purposes because reporting of progress is centralized.23
Ownership rights of lands held communally are less
confusing and create less opportunity for individualized
ulterior motives when compared to individually owned
property, which can be “owned” in a variety of ways
(i.e. access, use, exclusion, and management rights).24
Collective management may be the answer to a more
productive and self-governing PES provider profile.
5	Focus on financial integrity–This objective recognizes
that not all funding sources are created equal due to
lack of governance, control, and transparency. These
shortcomings can be found in both private investment
scenarios and investment banking undertakings. There
is less governance and visibility overall when private
investors are simply paying for ad-hoc projects to abate
the effects of their pollution activity.25 Without a central
reporting mechanism, these agreements are merely
contracts between private parties with uncontrolled
externalities.26 Investment banking PES implementations tend to institute more safeguards, but governance
is still left to the banks’ discretion in most cases. The
European Investment Bank (EIB) is an example of governance headed in the right direction.27 It has reporting

and enforcement safeguards in place to ensure its project
funds are being used effectively and as intended.28 It also
practices holistic project evaluation before backing funding by ensuring unintended consequences that might
actually harm the objective of the project are evaluated.29
Implementing all five objectives in one fell swoop may
prove difficult. However, some countries have already figured
out how to implement the meat of these strategies using nationally based PES systems. Though not perfect, nationally based
systems remain leaders in effective conservation strategies.
Mexico, for example, launched its national program, Program
for Payments of Environmental Services (PSAB), in 2003, which
is centrally funded, leverages strong institutional arrangements,
and makes use of the communal property regime.30 Payments
are made annually only after progress and compliance are verified through site visits and remote sensing.31 Monitoring procedures are implemented by the National Forestry Commission
(CONAFOR), which delegates PSAB enforcement responsibilities to a sub-committee.32 Because the sub-committee is
comprised of stakeholders covering all facets of PES projects,33
transparency is easily accomplished.
As a result, Mexico boasts more forested areas today; in
2010, as compared to 2000, Mexico is now deforesting less than
155 hectares per year as compared to 354 hectares annually.34
As deforestation continues to fall steadily in Mexico, PSAB
has increased the value of forests to the community through
enhanced carbon stocks.35
Overall, PES systems today are flawed and present opportunities for improvement using the five strategies described and the
Mexican system as a framework for successful implementation.
National PES systems are more effective and true to conservation efforts because they are better positioned to implement the
five optimization strategies.36 Changing the way countries think
about soft commitments in climate change negotiations will
prove important for upcoming UNFCCC conferences where a
greater sense of social and environmental responsibility is likely
expected from both developing and developed countries.37 So
long as true conservationism is placed on the forefront of climate
change agendas, the once pervasive “pay to pollute” sentiment
should fall to the wayside.

Endnotes: Ridding PES Systems of the “Pay to Pollute” Principle: PES
Optimization Strategies
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See generally Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation, Global Greenhouse Warming, http://www.global-greenhouse-warming.com/climate-mitigation-and-adaptation.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (defining climate change
mitigation versus adaptation components to climate change agreements);.
see Climate Change and President Obama’s Action Plan, The White House,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/climate-change (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the components and objectives of the Clean Power Plan—a plan setting a
carbon dioxide emissions reduction target to 32% below 2005 levels by 2030,
creating first-ever standards for existing power plants); Mark Landler, U.S. and

China Reach Climate Accord After Months of Talks, N.Y. Times
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/china-us-xiobama-apec.html?_r=0 (reporting on the coined “landmark” reciprocal agreement between the United States and China to curb carbon emissions by 2025
and 2030, respectively).
2
The UNFCCC is a conglomerate of signee countries to an international
treaty focused on mitigating, adapting to, and abating the impacts of climate
change detrimentally impacting ecology and the environment. The focus of
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137 See id. at § 312.1.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id. at § 202(defining “agricultural building” as “[a] structure designed
and constructed to house farm implements, hay, grain, poultry, livestock or
other horticultural products. This structure shall not be a place of human habitation or a place of employment where agricultural products are processed, treated
or packaged, nor shall it be a place used by the public).
141 See id. at § 3401.1-3401.6.
142 See id. at § 3401.2.
143 See id. at § 3401.3.
144 See King, supra note 134, at 409.
145 See, e.g., Phoenix, Ariz., 2012 Phoenix Building Construction Code
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159 See City of Phoenix, supra note 153.
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162 See City of Phoenix, supra note 153.
163 See id.
164 See supra Part IV A (discussing how current building codes function).
165 See supra Part II A (giving a background on how an aquaponics farm
works).
166 See IBC, supra note 133, at § 202.
167 See id.
168 See id.
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the UNFCCC is on stabilizing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the
atmosphere to a less volatile and more sustainable level. See Background on the
UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/
essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Nov. 13, 205) [hereinafter
“Background on the UNFCCC”].
3
See id.; see also Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited
Nov. 6, 2015) (describing the role of the Kyoto Protocol was to set internationally binding emissions reduction targets).
4
See generally id. (discussing hard number commitments); Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon
Stocks in Developing Countries (REDD-plus), UNFCCC Int., http://unfccc.
int/land_use_and_climate_change/redd/items/7377.php (last visited Nov. 14,
2015) (discussing the REDD program which involves other countries helping
to finance and provide technical support to developing countries to abate and
reverse the effects of deforestation).
5
See generally Richard B. Stewart et al., Climate Finance: Key Concepts
and Ways Forward 1-2, available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
Stewart_Final_2.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
6
PES is known by other names including Payment for Ecosystem Services
and Green Growth Strategies, but each refers to the same basic type of agreement in which there is a service provider—the landowner, and there is a
payor—the person, private company, non-profit, or governmental entity paying
for conservation efforts. See generally Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev.,
Green Growth and Developing Countries: Consultation Draft, 10-11, Org.
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for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., (June 2012), available at http://www.google.
com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CEwQFjAFahU
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(“Choosing not to bring more land under cultivation because of the high environmental costs will be difficult for a country with high levels of poverty.”).
7
See Markets and Payments for Environmental Services, Int’l Inst. for Env’t
and Dev., http://www.iied.org/markets-payments-for-environmental-services
(last visited Nov. 6, 2015) [hereinafter “Markets and Payments for Environmental Services”]. These payments are similar, incentive-wise to subsidies and taxes
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8
See id.; see also Katoomba Grp. and UNEP, Payments for Ecosystem
Services Getting Started: A Primer 5, 26 (2008), available at http://www.
unep.org/pdf/PaymentsForEcosystemServices_en.pdf [hereinafter Payments for
Ecosystem Services Getting Started] (discussing how payment for watershed
services currently exists in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Bolivia, India, South Africa,
Mexico, and the United States).
9
Alternatively, many support the contention that PES is instead characterized by the “common but differentiated” principle because historically, developed countries fund PES projects in less developed countries to promote an
identified conservation goal, thereby reducing activity responsible for producing
climate change effects in exchange for a fee. Therefore, the common purpose is
served: reducing climate change impacts. See Natural Res. Mgmt. and Env’t
Dep’t Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Payments for Environmental Services Within the Context of the Green Economy 4 (Sept. 2010),
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available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al922e/al922e00.pdf [hereinafter
Payments for Environmental Services].
10
Even commitments operating under a guise of true hard commitments to
mitigate emissions fall prey to the “pay to pollute” concept because even the
Kyoto Protocol allows for carbon credits and trading schemes. See Payments
for Ecosystem Services Getting Started, supra note 8, at 5.
11
See id. at 3, 5, 10.
12
See id. at 11, 12 (describing the problems associated with PES including:
leakage wherein service providers merely shift unsustainable land management
operations to other areas not covered by the agreement; lacking institutional
capacity and transparency; land ownership issues and lacking property rights
regimes).
13
See generally John M. Broder, At Meeting on Climate Change, Urgent
Issues but Low Expectations, N.Y. Times (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/11/28/science/earth/nations-meet-to-address-problems-of-climatechange.html?_r=0 (noting how the United States and other countries with
similar stances adamantly oppose making unilateral binding emission target
commitments); Mike McDonald, US debt helps Costa Rica save planet, Tico
Times (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.ticotimes.net/2010/11/30/us-debt-helpscosta-rica-save-planet (reporting on how the United States funded five Costa
Rican forest conservation initiatives by forgiving a portion of Costa Rican
debt).
14
See generally Markets and Payments for Environmental Services, supra
note 7.
15
See generally id. (discussing PES as a market-based conservation strategy).
16
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) and Oil Pollution Act (OPA), both statutory bodies
allow for the restoration of natural resources lost in the spill or leakage. See
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 107(a)(4)(C) (“damages for injury to, destruction of,
or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release”); 33 U.S.C. §1012(a)
(2). The measure of damages is the cost of restoring injured resources to their
baseline condition. See 43 CFR Part 11; 15 CFR Part 990.
17
Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev./World Bank, Lessons Learned
for REDD+ from PES and Conservation Incentive Programs 79 (2012),
available at http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/Full%20version%20of%20PES%20Lessons%20
for%20REDD+%20March%202012.pdf [hereinafter Lessons Learned for
REDD+].
18
Convention on Biological Diversity, Case Studies of Biodiversity Markets for Forest Environmental Services 10, available at https://www.cbd.int/
financial/pes/several-pes-iied.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2015).
19
See Markets and Payments for Environmental Services, supra note 7.
20
See Payments for Ecosystem Services Getting Started, supra note 8, at
11, 12.
21
See id.
22
See generally Green Growth, supra note 6, at 10 (“Choosing not to bring
more land under cultivation because of the high environmental costs will be
difficult for a country with high levels of poverty.”).
23
See generally Payments for Ecosystem Services Getting Started, supra
note 8, at 45-46 (indicating that each member of the communally owned property has property transfer rights, and therefore some decision making capacity).
Also, communal property regimes are more common in developing countries,
which makes this strategy congruent with strategy number three: targeting
developing countries. See id. at 10 (citing that as many as twenty percent of
forests formally recognized as communally owned); David Bray, Mexican
Common Property Forest Governance, http://p2pfoundation.net/Mexican_Common_Property_Forest_Governance (last updated July 18, 2013) (indicating that
democratic land management such as communal property ownership is effective
in the context of PES implementations because there are lower transaction
costs, a sense of kinship and mutual knowledge, and easier governance, including self-governance using community leaders and an elected assembly that has
decision making and contract monitoring capacity).
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(discussing the necessity of conducting environmental and biodiversity impact
assessments prior to securing funding for a project and the Natural Capital
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Social Principles and Standards 11 (2009), available at http://www.eib.org/
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EIB’s objectives is to monitor the environmental and social performance of the
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29
See Environmental and Social Safeguards, supra note 27.
30
See Lessons Learned for REDD+, supra note 17, at xvii. PSAB is
currently funded through a conglomerate of federal sources, “amounting to
approximately $100 million USD of project funds per year, distributed through
the Mexican Forest Fund” and currently covers 2.2 million hectares of forest.
Most of the Mexican Forest Fund’s budget comes from the CONAFOR and
international donors such as the World Bank. See id. at 115-16. The communal
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David Bray, Mexican Common Property Forest Governance, http://p2pfoundation.net/Mexican_Common_Property_Forest_Governance (last visited Nov. 15,
2015).
31
See Lessons Learned for REDD+, supra note 17, at 16. Remote sensing
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32
See id. at 49. Conservation responsibilities are also doled out to independent government entities, such as the Ministry of Environment, leading to
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and reporting and enforcement mechanisms are readily available. See id. at 2-3.
33
See id. (The national ProArbol Technical Committee is a sub-committee
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34
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36
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items/6239.php (last visited Nov. 6, 2015) (noting CoP 21 scheduled Paris
France for November and December 2015).
25

41

